Why Inter-State Councils Rarely Matter

The Constitution of India provides for an Inter-State Council under Article 263, enabling the President to establish a council to inquire into and advise on disputes between states, investigate and discuss subjects of common interest between the Union and states, and make recommendations on any subject. The article itself does not mandate the Council's existence — it only enables the President to constitute one "if it appears to the President that the public interest would be served by the establishment of a Council." 

The Inter-State Council was eventually constituted by Presidential order in 1990 — 40 years after the Constitution came into force — chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising all Chief Ministers, Cabinet Ministers of the Union and states as members. Despite its impressive membership and the breadth of its mandate, the Council has met infrequently and its recommendations have had modest policy impact relative to the significance of Centre-state issues it is mandated to address.

Representational Image: Why Inter-State Councils Rarely Matter

The gap between the Inter-State Council's constitutional mandate and its actual performance illustrates a broader truth about India's federal architecture: the formal mechanisms for Centre-state coordination tend to function less reliably than the informal political channels that daily govern Centre-state relations. The Finance Commission is a partial exception — its five-year cycle is constitutionally mandated and its recommendations are politically authoritative. The GST Council has functioned more actively than the Inter-State Council since 2017. But the Inter-State Council — the constitutionally imagined forum for broad Centre-state dialogue on federal governance — has been convened less than a dozen times in 35 years, typically when politically convenient and left dormant when contentious issues would make structured deliberation uncomfortable for the governing party.

What You Need to Know

• Article 263 of the Constitution enables the President to establish an Inter-State Council to discuss matters of common interest, investigate inter-state disputes, and make recommendations; the Council was constituted by Presidential order only in 1990 — four decades after independence.
• The Inter-State Council has met approximately 11 times since its constitution in 1990; it was last reconvened in 2016 (after a 10-year gap); as of May 2025 no meeting has been announced for the 18th Lok Sabha period, though the 16th Finance Commission report tabled in February 2026 recommended reactivating the Council for fiscal matters.
• The Council has no independent secretariat with significant research capacity and no executive powers; its recommendations are advisory; it operates through a Standing Committee and a Secretariat staffed by the Ministry of Home Affairs; its deliberative output depends on member governments' engagement, which varies with political configurations.
• The Sarkaria Commission (1988) on Centre-State relations — which comprehensively reviewed Indian federalism — was established outside the Inter-State Council framework and reported separately; similarly, the Punchhi Commission (2010) was a separate body; the practice of constituting independent commissions to address systemic federal issues, rather than using the Inter-State Council, reflects the latter's institutional weakness.
• The Zonal Councils — established under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, predating the Inter-State Council — provide sub-national coordination forums for adjacent states and the Centre; the five Zonal Councils (Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, Central) meet annually under the chairmanship of Union Home Minister and have addressed specific inter-state issues including border disputes, river water, and law enforcement cooperation with somewhat more regularity than the Inter-State Council.

How It Works in Practice

1. When the Council has met: Meetings in 1990 and the subsequent years addressed implementation of the Sarkaria Commission's recommendations; later meetings addressed specific policy questions including Centre-state financial relations, internal security, and regulatory harmonisation. The 2016 meeting discussed agenda items including internal security, improving governance, and Centre-state fiscal relations. Each meeting produces a record of discussions and recommendations but without binding authority.

2. Why the Council is rarely convened: The most fundamental reason is political: the Inter-State Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by all Chief Ministers. When large states are governed by opposition parties, summoning the Chief Ministers to a council chaired by the Prime Minister creates a forum that the opposition can use to publicly criticise central policy — something the Centre prefers to avoid. The Council's deliberative mandate cannot be easily controlled by the ruling party; its political risk is therefore consistently higher than its governance benefit appears to be.

3. Alternative coordination mechanisms: The substantive work that the Inter-State Council is designed to do tends to happen through other channels: the GST Council for fiscal matters; the Chief Ministers' Conference (summoned on specific issues like education, agriculture, or security) which the Centre can convene on its own terms and on specific agenda items; NITI Aayog's Governing Council (Prime Minister plus all Chief Ministers), which meets annually; and bilateral Centre-state negotiations on specific schemes and projects.

4. The 16th Finance Commission recommendation: The 16th Finance Commission's report (submitted November 2025) specifically recommended reactivating the Inter-State Council for "real-time federalism" on fiscal matters — including grant delays and other inter-governmental fiscal issues. Whether this recommendation is implemented depends on political will from the Union government.

5. Zonal Councils as more functional alternatives: The five Zonal Councils — each including 5–6 states and Union territories in a geographic region, chaired by the Union Home Minister — have maintained more regular meeting schedules than the Inter-State Council. They address specific inter-state coordination issues (cross-border crime, power grids, river disputes, road networks) with more operational focus and less of the political exposure that comes with a plenary all-India forum.

What People Often Misunderstand

• Article 263 does not mandate the Council's existence: The Constitution only enables the President to constitute a council if it appears to be in the public interest — the constitution was delayed 40 years and can remain dormant indefinitely without constitutional violation.
• The Council's existence does not constrain the Centre's unilateral action: The Inter-State Council has no veto or consent function; the Centre can legislate, spend, and implement policies affecting states without Inter-State Council endorsement; the Council is a deliberative forum, not a constitutional check.
• NITI Aayog's Governing Council is not the same as the Inter-State Council: NITI Aayog's Governing Council — Prime Minister with all Chief Ministers — was constituted in 2015 and meets annually; it is a policy consultation body within NITI Aayog's structure, not the constitutionally mandated Inter-State Council under Article 263; both exist but serve different institutional purposes.
• The GST Council is a more functional federal body than the Inter-State Council: The GST Council has a specific mandate, regular meeting schedule, weighted voting, and specific fiscal subject matter; it has functioned far more consistently than the Inter-State Council; the structural difference is that the GST Council's agenda is concrete and bounded, while the Inter-State Council's is broad and potentially politically uncomfortable.
• Reform proposals for the Council have been made repeatedly without result: Both the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission recommended strengthening the Inter-State Council with a permanent secretariat, regular schedule, and stronger research capacity; the 16th Finance Commission added its voice in 2025; none of these recommendations has been implemented in the three decades since the Sarkaria Commission reported.

What Changes Over Time

The 16th Finance Commission's recommendation to reactivate the Inter-State Council with a specific fiscal mandate represents the most recent formal proposal for institutional revival. The political conditions in 2025–26 — with the 18th Lok Sabha reflecting coalition dynamics and several large states under opposition governments — may make Council convening politically unattractive for the same reasons that reduced its use in previous periods of Centre-opposition state conflict. The delimitation debate, involving all states, may eventually create enough political pressure for a formal federal forum to address representational concerns.

Sources and Further Reading

• Constitution of India — Article 263: https://indiankanoon.org
• Anantam IAS — Federalism in India: https://anantamias.com/federalism-india/
• PRS Legislative Research — 16th Finance Commission: https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/report-of-the-16th-finance-commission-for-2026-31
• Super Kalam — Centre-State Relations: https://superkalam.com/upsc-mains/topics/centre-state-relations

(This series is part of a long-term editorial project to explain the structures, institutions, and practical realities of governance in India for a global audience. Designed as a 25-article briefing cluster on Federalism, States & Centre–State Relations, this vertical examines how power, money, and authority are distributed between New Delhi and India's states — from the Seventh Schedule, fiscal federalism, GST, Governors, and central agencies to Centre–state disputes, regional parties, and the evolving balance of the Indian Union. Written in an accessible format for diplomats, investors, researchers, academics, journalists, students, policymakers, civil society organisations, and international observers, the series seeks to explain both the constitutional design of Indian federalism and the political realities through which it operates in practice. This is Vertical 4 of a larger 20-vertical knowledge architecture being developed by IndianRepublic.in under the editorial direction of Saket Suman. All articles are protected under applicable copyright laws. All Rights Reserved.)