Decoding Governor's Role in Indian Federal Politics

The Governor is simultaneously the constitutional head of state government and the Centre's representative in each state. Under Article 153, each state must have a Governor; under Article 155, the Governor is appointed by the President (in practice, on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers). The Governor's constitutional functions are largely ceremonial: they summon and prorogue the state legislature, appoint the Chief Minister and swear in the Cabinet, and address the legislature at the beginning of each year. In the ordinary course of a state government with a clear majority, the Governor acts on the advice of the state Council of Ministers and functions as a constitutional figurehead. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) on Centre-State relations described the intended role as that of "a neutral arbiter and not a Centre's agent."

Representational Image: Decoding Governor's Role in Indian Federal Politics

In practice, Governors have frequently been political instruments. The appointment of retired politicians, former intelligence officers, and ruling party loyalists to Governorships has been a consistent feature across governments since independence. The consequences were most visible during the period of frequent President's Rule (Article 356 proclamations), when Governors provided the political cover for dismissing opposition state governments on grounds that courts subsequently questioned. The Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) substantially restricted this misuse by making Article 356 proclamations subject to judicial review. The most recent constitutional development — the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu — addressed a new dimension of Governor-state conflict: the withholding of assent to state legislation, and the subsequent revision by a Constitution Bench in November 2025.

What the Evidence Shows

• The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) held that Governor R.N. Ravi's action of indefinitely withholding assent to 10 bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly was "illegal" and "erroneous"; the Court invoked Article 142 to grant "deemed assent" to the bills, making them law without the Governor's formal assent — described by The Wire as the first time in Indian constitutional history that legislations became law without assent from either Governor or President.
• In November 2025, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rolled back the "deemed assent" mechanism from the April ruling, holding that courts cannot prescribe mandatory timelines for Governors or the President to act on bills, as the Constitution does not set such timelines; Scroll reported this as the Court removing "its own deadline" — reflecting the tension between state legislative autonomy and the judicial limits of the remedy.
• Article 200 of the Constitution gives Governors four options when a Bill is presented: assent, withhold assent and return with a message, or reserve for the President's consideration; if the legislature re-passes a bill, the Governor "shall not withhold assent" — but the Constitution specifies no timeframe for action.
• Between 2022 and 2025, Governors of Tamil Nadu (R.N. Ravi), Kerala (Arif Mohammed Khan), Punjab (Banwarilal Purohit), and Telangana withheld or delayed assent to multiple state bills, in each case involving states governed by opposition parties; the pattern was documented in multiple courts and academic analyses.
• The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and Punchhi Commission (2010) on Centre-State relations both recommended that Governors be appointed on consultation with state Chief Ministers, act impartially, and refrain from partisan behaviour; neither recommendation has been implemented through statute.

How It Works in Practice

1. Appointment as a political tool: The Governor's appointment under Article 155 by the President (on Cabinet advice) means the Union government effectively chooses each state's constitutional head. This has consistently produced a pattern where incoming central governments appoint their loyalists as Governors, and opposition-ruled states receive Governors from the Centre's political camp. The constitutional design anticipated neutral appointments; the practice has not delivered them.

2. Government formation discretion: After elections that produce no clear majority, the Governor has real discretion in determining which party leader to invite to form the government and how long to allow for floor tests. This discretion has been used and misused in high-profile cases: Karnataka (2018), Goa (2017), Maharashtra (2019), and Arunachal Pradesh (2016) all saw Governor actions that state governments or courts subsequently questioned. The Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia (2016) and subsequent cases has restricted the scope of gubernatorial discretion in government formation.

3. Assent to state bills: Under Articles 200–201, the Governor may either assent, withhold assent (returning the bill with a message), or reserve for the President. If a state legislature re-passes a bill after the Governor's return, the Governor must assent. The controversy arises when Governors neither return bills with reasons nor assent — simply holding them indefinitely. Courts have now characterised this as a "pocket veto" that the Constitution does not permit.

4. Reservation for the President: If a Governor reserves a bill for Presidential consideration, the Centre (through the President acting on Cabinet advice) decides whether to assent or withhold. This gives the Centre a veto over state legislation on any subject where the Governor chooses to reserve. The Tamil Nadu case showed Governors using this route strategically — after being directed by courts to act on bills, rather than assenting, reserving them for the President.

5. The 2025 position after the Constitution Bench: After November 2025, the constitutional position is: Governors cannot exercise a "pocket veto" but courts cannot prescribe mandatory timelines. State governments may challenge delay as unconstitutional through writ petitions. The April 2025 "deemed assent" mechanism is available only as a last resort under Article 142 where complete justice requires it. The fundamental structural problem — Centre-appointed Governors in opposition-ruled states — remains unaddressed by constitutional amendment.

What People Often Misunderstand

• The Governor is not an executive head: The Governor is a constitutional head; executive power is exercised by the Chief Minister and Cabinet; the Governor's role is largely ceremonial except in specific discretionary situations (government formation, reserved bills, President's Rule recommendations).
• The Constitution anticipates neutrality; practice delivers partisanship: The Governor's oath (Article 159) requires preserving and protecting the Constitution; the Supreme Court has cited this oath in directing Governors to act constitutionally rather than in partisan ways.
• Governor controversies are not new: Partisan use of Governors predates 2014; Congress governments similarly appointed party loyalists and used Governors to destabilise opposition state governments; the scale and visibility has increased but the structural problem is longstanding.
• The President is not a neutral arbiter either: Bills reserved for Presidential consideration are decided by the President on Cabinet advice; in effect, the Union Council of Ministers decides; the Presidential reservation route effectively gives the Centre a second veto on state legislation.
• State Chief Ministers are sworn in by the Governor, not elected by the assembly: The Governor formally appoints and swears in the Chief Minister; in cases of post-election ambiguity, the Governor's choice of whom to invite first to form the government has been consequential.

What Changes Over Time

The April 2025 Tamil Nadu Governor judgment and the November 2025 Constitution Bench revision represent the most significant recent constitutional development in federalism jurisprudence. The net position — Governors cannot pocket veto but courts cannot mandate timelines — leaves the structural problem of partisan Governors unresolved and awaits either a constitutional amendment or a fuller constitutional settlement. Kerala's Article 131 suit against the Centre over withheld bills (filed 2023) and similar suits from Punjab and Telangana represent states choosing judicial rather than political resolution of Governor conflicts — creating a new jurisprudential body on federal executive relationships.

Sources and Further Reading

• Supreme Court Observer — Tamil Nadu Governor judgment summary: https://www.scobserver.in/reports/pendency-of-bills-before-tamil-nadu-governor-judgement-summary/
• I-Connect — Clarifying Gubernatorial Powers: https://www.iconnectblog.com/clarifying-gubernatorial-powers-in-the-legislative-process-the-indian-supreme-courts-judgment-in-state-of-tamil-nadu-v-governor-of-tamil-nadu/
• The Wire — SC Judgment Restores Autonomy of State Legislatures: https://m.thewire.in/article/government/why-the-scs-judgment-in-r-n-ravi-case-restores-the-autonomy-of-elected-state-legislatures/amp
• Scroll — SC rolls back deadline for governors: https://scroll.in/article/1088699/why-supreme-court-removed-its-own-deadline-meant-to-prevent-governors-sitting-on-bills
• Insights on India — SC Verdict on Governor's Role: https://www.insightsonindia.com/2025/04/16/upsc-editorial-analysis-supreme-courts-landmark-verdict-on-tamil-nadu-governors-bill-reservation/

(This series is part of a long-term editorial project to explain the structures, institutions, and practical realities of governance in India for a global audience. Designed as a 25-article briefing cluster on Federalism, States & Centre–State Relations, this vertical examines how power, money, and authority are distributed between New Delhi and India's states — from the Seventh Schedule, fiscal federalism, GST, Governors, and central agencies to Centre–state disputes, regional parties, and the evolving balance of the Indian Union. Written in an accessible format for diplomats, investors, researchers, academics, journalists, students, policymakers, civil society organisations, and international observers, the series seeks to explain both the constitutional design of Indian federalism and the political realities through which it operates in practice. This is Vertical 4 of a larger 20-vertical knowledge architecture being developed by IndianRepublic.in under the editorial direction of Saket Suman. All articles are protected under applicable copyright laws. All Rights Reserved.)