Decoding Centre–State Conflict as a Political Tool
Centre-state conflict in India has a persistent dual character: it is simultaneously a constitutional question about the division of powers and a political instrument deployed by both central and state governments to advance their electoral interests, mobilise constituencies, and deflect responsibility for governance failures. When the BJP-led Union government and a state government governed by a regional or opposition party dispute GST compensation, the conflict is partly about money and partly about who gets credit for state fiscal management in the next election.
When a Governor delays assenting to state bills, the constitutional question about Article 200 timelines is inseparable from the political reality that the Governor was appointed by the Union government to serve as its representative in an opposition-ruled state. When a state government blames the Centre for inadequate flood relief funds and the Centre blames the state for poor preparedness, both descriptions may be factually accurate — and the attribution dispute is designed to shape who voters hold responsible.
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| Representational Image: Decoding Centre–State Conflict as a Political Tool |
Shankar IAS
Parliament's 2023 analysis documented how "economic conflicts between
Centre and States have increased and become a source of persistent frictions in
the federal system" as states gain the political confidence to challenge
central policy decisions they disagree with. What has changed is not primarily
the constitutional framework but the political conditions: a more competitive,
more regionally diverse party system has made Centre-state political conflict
both more common and more visible.
What You Need to Know
- Drishti
IAS's 2024 "Frictions in Centre-State Relations" analysis
documented that frictions had intensified post-2021, with: states
reverting to the Old Pension Scheme (rejecting central NPS direction);
central spending concentrated in UP, Maharashtra, and Gujarat; Tamil Nadu
opposing NEET for medical admissions; farm law repeal after state
opposition; and multiple Governor-state legislative standoffs.
- States
have used Article 131 — Supreme Court original jurisdiction for disputes
between Centre and states — with increasing frequency in recent years:
Kerala sued the Centre over GST compensation defaults; Tamil Nadu sued
over Governor assent; Chhattisgarh challenged the NIA Act; these legal
challenges represent states choosing judicial rather than political
resolution for federal conflicts.
- The
withdrawal of CBI general consent — a largely symbolic political act with
limited operational effect — has been undertaken by at least 10
opposition-ruled states by 2024; it signals political disagreement with
central investigative agency deployment without effectively preventing CBI
operations; it is primarily a political message to state constituencies
about the Chief Minister standing up to central overreach.
- The
farm laws controversy (2020–2021) demonstrated how Centre-state conflict
can be politically leveraged: the BJP-led Centre passed three central
agricultural marketing laws affecting agriculture (a State List subject);
Punjab, Chhattisgarh, and other opposition-ruled states passed their own
state laws repudiating the central laws; the farmer protests —
predominantly from Punjab and Haryana — became a sustained political
crisis; the Centre repealed the laws in November 2021.
- Tamil
Nadu's opposition to NEET (National Eligibility Entrance Test) for
undergraduate medical admissions — which it has resisted as a
centralisation of education (a Concurrent List subject) that disadvantages
Tamil Nadu's state board students — has produced a decade-long standoff,
multiple state legislative resolutions, and is pending before the Supreme
Court as of 2025.
How It Works in Practice
1. Resource-claim conflicts: The most common form of
Centre-state conflict is about money — GST compensation disputes, inadequate
Finance Commission devolution, delayed release of funds under Centrally
Sponsored Schemes, inadequate disaster relief grants. These conflicts have
clear material stakes and also serve political purposes: a Chief Minister who
visibly fights the Centre for his state's due resources builds credibility with
voters as a regional champion, regardless of whether the conflict is resolved.
2. Scheme-design conflicts: State governments
frequently contest the design of central schemes that they must implement,
arguing that one-size-fits-all designs ignore state-specific conditions. Tamil
Nadu's opposition to NEP language provisions; Punjab's and West Bengal's
opposition to the farm laws; multiple states' opposition to the National
Pension Scheme — all represent states asserting the right to design welfare and
development policy in ways that fit their political economies.
3. Legislative jurisdiction conflicts: When the
Centre legislates on subjects that states consider their domain — agriculture,
labour law, education — states may enact counter-legislation asserting state
jurisdiction. This creates legal complexity (whose law prevails on a Concurrent
subject?) and political signals (the Chief Minister is asserting state
authority against central overreach). Punjab and Chhattisgarh's
counter-legislation to the farm laws was legally weak but politically effective
as a mobilisation device.
4. Governor as political instrument: The partisan use
of Governors — appointing ruling party loyalists to Governorships in opposition
states — and the subsequent Governor controversies over bill assent, government
formation, and cabinet formation are a recurring political tool. The Centre can
constrain an opposition state government's legislative agenda through a
partisan Governor without changing any law or taking any formal legal action.
This is the federal equivalent of playing on the margins of legality in
political competition.
5. Investigation agency deployment: As analysed in
Article 8 of this label, the deployment of ED and CBI against opposition
politicians — timed around elections, targeting Chief Ministers and state-level
leaders — is both a legal action (where the allegations are genuine) and a
political tool (where timing and selectivity suggest political motivation).
States' response — CBI consent withdrawal, Article 131 suits, political
counter-messaging — represents the state-level political defence against this
tool.
What People Often Misunderstand
- Centre-state
conflict is not primarily a federalism problem: The constitutional
federal framework has not changed; what has changed is the political
competition between Centre and states; the conflict is as much about
electoral politics as constitutional questions.
- Both
Centre and state governments benefit from conflict: A Union government
that can frame state policy failures as the Centre rescuing citizens from
incompetent opposition state governance, and a state government that can
frame central overreach as an attack on state autonomy and culture, both
use the conflict for political mobilisation.
- Conflict
coexists with substantial policy cooperation: Even states in intense
political conflict with the Centre — West Bengal under Mamata Banerjee,
Tamil Nadu under MK Stalin — cooperate on central schemes, receive Finance
Commission transfers, and implement central legislation in most domains;
political conflict is concentrated in visible, high-profile episodes
rather than pervading all Centre-state interactions.
- Article
131 challenges represent escalation beyond political negotiation: When
states sue the Centre in the Supreme Court, it signals that the political
negotiation has failed; the resort to Article 131 — which was historically
rare — has become more common precisely because the informal and political
mechanisms for resolving disputes are functioning less well.
- The
media amplifies visible conflicts while invisible cooperation continues:
The Governor controversy, CBI consent withdrawal, and farm law opposition
receive extensive coverage because they are visible political acts; the
routine implementation of centrally funded schemes, financial devolution,
and intergovernmental coordination on hundreds of issues receives minimal
coverage.
What Changes Over Time
The 18th Lok Sabha's coalition arithmetic — BJP dependent on TDP and JD(U) for its majority — has reduced the Centre's capacity for unilateral confrontation with state governments of coalition partners; political incentives now favour accommodation with at least some previously adversarial state relationships.
The 131st Amendment on Lok Sabha expansion and
delimitation is generating new Centre-state political conflict that cuts across
existing party lines — even BJP-governed states with slower population growth
share concerns with opposition-governed southern states about losing seats.
This cross-cutting conflict may produce new inter-state political coalitions
that transcend the simple Centre-versus-opposition-states framing of recent
years.
Sources and Further Reading
- Shankar
IAS Parliament — Centre-State Disputes: https://www.shankariasparliament.com/current-affairs/centre-state-disputes
- Drishti
IAS — Frictions in Centre-State Relations: https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/frictions-in-centre-state-relations
- Shankar
IAS Parliament — States' Power to Challenge Centre (Article 131): https://www.shankariasparliament.com/current-affairs/states-power-to-challenge-centre
- Super Kalam — Centre-State Relations: https://superkalam.com/upsc-mains/topics/centre-state-relations
- The Academic — Changing Role of Centre-State Relations 2014-2024: https://theacademic.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/56.pdf