How Government Controls Media in India
The relationship between the Indian government and the media it does not directly own operates through multiple channels that are collectively described as "media capture" — the process by which governments secure favourable media coverage without direct ownership or overt censorship. India's media control mechanisms operate at three levels: legal (using legislation and criminal law against critical journalists and outlets); economic (using government advertising dependency and licensing authority to reward compliant and punish critical media); and regulatory (using telecommunications, information technology, and broadcast regulations to limit independent media's operational environment).
The RSF's 2026 World Press Freedom Index identifies all three mechanisms as operative in India: "Modi has introduced several new laws that give the government extraordinary power to control the media, censor news and silence critics, including the 2023 Telecommunications Act, the 2023 Information Technology Amendment Rules, and the 2023 Digital Personal Data Protection Act."
 |
| Representational Visualisation: How Government Controls Media in India |
Government advertising can be withheld from outlets that publish critical coverage; it can be increased for outlets that publish favourable coverage; and the prospect of advertising withdrawal affects editorial calculations even before any specific incident. The RSF 2026 report states explicitly that "under Narendra Modi, billions of dollars of public funds have been spent on advertising" and that governments "are in a position to and do put pressure on the media to censor their content." The Advertising Standards Council of India does not regulate government advertising content or allocation.
What You Need to Know
- Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting (MIB): the central government ministry
that regulates television channels, film certification (through CBFC),
radio broadcasting, and information policy; grants channel licences under
the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act and the
Uplinking/Downlinking Guidelines for satellite TV.
- IT
Rules 2021 (and subsequent amendments): require digital news publishers
and OTT platforms to: appoint a Grievance Officer in India; establish a
self-regulatory body; submit to a government-level oversight committee
with power to direct content removal or censorship; challenged in multiple
High Courts; the Sahyog portal (2026 IT amendment) enables three-hour
content takedown requirements.
- Section
69A of the IT Act: authorises MeitY (Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology) to direct intermediaries (platforms, ISPs) to
block content on grounds including sovereignty, defence, or public order;
used to block Twitter (X) accounts of journalists, news websites, and
documentary films (including BBC's banned Modi documentary in February
2023); blocking orders are not required to be publicly disclosed.
- Government
advertising quantum: no official consolidated figure is published for
total government (central + state) advertising expenditure across media;
estimates based on partial data suggest tens of thousands of crores
annually; the Bureau of Outreach and Communication (BOC, under MIB)
handles central government advertising; state governments have their own
advertising mechanisms; the absence of transparent data makes the
mechanism difficult to document but its existence is well established in
journalistic practice.
- The
BBC India raid (February 2023): Income Tax Department conducted a
three-day "survey" of BBC India offices in Delhi and Mumbai
shortly after the BBC broadcast (and the government banned through IT Act
Section 69A) a documentary critical of Modi's 2002 Gujarat role; the Press
Club of India called it "a clear cut case of vendetta";
subsequently the ED investigated BBC for FEMA violations and fined it in
2025.
How It Works in Practice
1. Channel licensing as leverage: Television channel
licences (uplink permissions, downlink permissions) are granted by MIB for
fixed periods and require renewal; a channel that faces licensing delay or
non-renewal is commercially existential; the threat of adverse licensing action
is a structural deterrent against sustained critical coverage that reaches
MIB's attention.
2. The IT Rules' grievance mechanism: Under the 2021
IT Rules, any person can file a complaint against digital news content with the
platform's designated Grievance Officer; unresolved complaints escalate to a
self-regulatory body; persistent issues can escalate to the government's
oversight body which can direct content removal. This mechanism creates
multiple points at which organised complaints (including from
government-aligned groups) can pressure digital news publishers to remove
content.
3. Tax and regulatory raids as pressure: The Income
Tax and Enforcement Directorate raids documented in the GIJN (2024) analysis —
Newslaundry (twice), BBC, and others — function as regulatory pressure rather
than necessarily resulting in actual prosecution. The disruption of newsroom
operations during a multi-day raid, combined with the legal costs and
organisational distraction of responding, is itself a significant deterrent to
sustained critical journalism.
4. Defamation law weaponisation: India's criminal
defamation provisions (BNS Sections 354–356, replacing IPC Sections 499–500)
allow private parties to file criminal complaints against journalists;
politicians and business figures use criminal defamation more than civil
defamation because the process itself — police investigation, court appearances
— is punitive for journalists even without ultimate conviction. The Wire has
faced 25+ FIRs across its editorial career; each FIR requires legal response
regardless of merit.
5. The spectrum of government-media relations: Not
all government-media interaction is hostile. The government's press
conferences, official press releases, PIB (Press Information Bureau)
accreditation system, and formal journalist interview access create
dependencies that many journalists manage by maintaining access relationships;
a journalist who writes a critical story about the PMO may lose PMO access;
this access quid-pro-quo operates across media globally but is particularly
acute in India's personalised political culture.
What People Often Misunderstand
- Direct
censorship is rare — indirect pressure is the primary mechanism: India
does not have a Soviet-style censorship bureau; the primary mechanism is
economic leverage (advertising), legal deterrence (FIRs, raids), and
social pressure (online harassment) — all of which operate without direct
censorship orders.
- The
IT Rules' challenges are ongoing: Multiple High Court challenges to
the 2021 IT Rules have produced conflicting rulings; the Supreme Court has
not yet definitively settled the constitutional validity of all
provisions; the regulatory framework remains in legal flux.
- State
governments also control media through advertising: The central
government's advertising leverage is often discussed, but state
governments — which also spend significantly on media advertising —
exercise similar leverage over regional and local media; media freedom
problems at the state level in Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and West Bengal are
often state-government driven.
- Emergency
period comparisons are historically instructive but contextually
different: Indira Gandhi's Emergency (1975–77) imposed direct
censorship with editors imprisoned; today's media environment is
significantly freer in formal terms; the comparison is made to indicate
directional trajectory rather than equivalence.
- Section
69A blocking orders are not publicly disclosed: The government blocks
content under IT Act Section 69A without being required to publicly
disclose the orders; this opacity makes it impossible for journalists,
courts, or civil society to systematically track the scope of content
blocking; the Internet Freedom Foundation and other organisations attempt
to document blocks but coverage is necessarily incomplete.
What Changes Over Time
The Sahyog portal's three-hour content takedown requirement
— introduced under 2026 IT Act amendments — represents a significant escalation
in government control over online content; even the US Trade Representative
(USTR) has characterised these requirements as "impractical and
politically motivated." The Supreme Court's active docket on IT Rules
constitutionality will be the defining legal development for India's online
press freedom in 2026–2027.
Sources and Further Reading
- RSF
— India country profile: https://rsf.org/en/country/india
- Wikipedia
— Freedom of the press in India: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_the_press_in_India
- GIJN
— Investigating India in election year: https://gijn.org/stories/india-independent-news-investigating-key-election-year/
- The
Wire — India 157th on RSF Index 2026: https://m.thewire.in/article/media/india-is-157th-out-of-180-countries-on-rsfs-2026-world-press-freedom-index
- RSF
— India press conference 2025: https://rsf.org/en/india-rsf-calls-press-freedom-world-s-largest-democracy