What Hindutva Means as Political Ideology
Hindutva — literally "Hindu-ness" or "Hindu-ism" as a political identity — is the ideological foundation of the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The term was first politically defined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1923 booklet "Essentials of Hindutva," written while he was under house arrest following his release from the Andaman Islands prison. Savarkar's definition was deliberately political rather than religious: a Hindu, in his formulation, is someone who regards India as both their pitribhumi (fatherland) and punyabhumi (holy land) — meaning Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains qualify as Hindus under his definition, while Muslims and Christians do not, because their holy lands are in Arabia and Palestine respectively. This ethnic-civilisational definition of Indian national identity — rather than the territorial-secular definition embedded in the Constitution — is the foundational claim of Hindutva as political ideology.
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| Representational Image: What Hindutva Means as Political Ideology |
Hindutva's supporters argue that it represents cultural nationalism that asserts a civilisational identity for India's Hindu-majority population, not religious bigotry; critics argue its practical manifestation involves the political subordination of religious minorities (particularly Muslims, who are 14% of India's population) to a Hindu-defined national identity that they cannot fully share.
The political implementation of this ideology under BJP
governments from 2014 onward — including the Citizenship Amendment Act,
revocation of Article 370, urban renaming, and
textbook revision — has shifted this debate from theoretical to concrete.
What You Need to Know
- Hindutva
ideology was formulated by V.D. Savarkar in 1923; its key political claim
is that India's national identity is Hindu civilisational in character,
making Hindus (defined broadly to include Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains) the
"natural" citizens of India while characterising Muslim and
Christian religious identities as foreign-originated.
- The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), enacted December 2019, provides a path to Indian citizenship for immigrants of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian religion from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan who fled persecution before December 2014; Muslims from those countries are explicitly excluded from eligibility; the Wikipedia BJP article notes this was "the first time religion had been overtly used as a criterion for citizenship under Indian law."
- BJP's
implementation since 2014 includes: abrogation of
Article 370 and Jammu and Kashmir's bifurcation (2019); criminalisation of
triple talaq (2019); new population control discussion in BJP-ruled
states; urban renaming (Allahabad to Prayagraj; Faizabad to Ayodhya); NRC
(National Register of Citizens) in Assam and proposed national NRC; and
systematic revision of school textbooks in BJP-governed states.
- A
V-Dem Institute report described India as experiencing "democratic
backsliding" in the Modi era; Pew survey data from 2023 cited in
Verfassungsblog showed 85% of Indian respondents said "military rule
or rule by an authoritarian leader would be good for the country" —
the highest share among 24 countries surveyed; and the share believing
opposition parties should operate freely was among the three lowest
globally.
How It Works in Practice
1. Political mobilisation through religious symbols:
BJP's electoral campaigns systematically deploy Hindu religious symbols,
temples, festivals, and cultural narratives to create emotional identification
between Hindu voters and the BJP as the defender of Hindu civilisational
interests. The Ram temple movement — which mobilised millions of Hindus around
the demand for a temple at the disputed Ayodhya site — was the original
template for this mobilisation; it demonstrated that emotional cultural
politics could override economic and governance calculations for a significant
voter segment.
2. Othering as coalition glue: Hindutva's
political effectiveness partly rests on defining Hindu identity against a "other" — framing some practices, institutions, and demands
as threats to Hindu culture and national integrity. The "love jihad" (Muslim men seduce Hindu women to convert them); the cow
protection movement; the demand for uniform civil code framed as ending "privilege"; and communal violence around tensions — all
reflect the political use of the framing to consolidate coalition
voting.
3. The welfare-Hindutva combination: Hindutva
nationalism works most effectively when combined with welfare delivery —
PM-KISAN payments, Ayushman Bharat health cards, gas connections, and housing
schemes create a material relationship between beneficiaries and the BJP
government that makes the Hindutva cultural appeal credible rather than
cynical. When welfare delivery is seen as genuine, voters are more willing to
extend cultural trust as well.
4. Saffronisation of institutions: Beyond electoral
politics, Hindutva as a civilisational project involves reshaping public
institutions — education (NCERT textbook revisions removing Mughal history,
adding emphasis on Hindu rulers); urban geography (renaming streets, cities,
and stations to remove Muslim historical names); cultural organisations
(placing Hindutva-aligned personnel in film and arts bodies); and legal
discourse (debates on Uniform Civil Code, Waqf properties, Places of Worship
Act).
5. The minority response: India's approximately 200
million Muslim citizens, 28 million Christians, and several hundred million
Dalits and Adivasis have varying relationships to Hindutva nationalism. Muslims
are most directly excluded by its core definition; the CAA's exclusion of
Muslim refugees from persecuting countries is the most overt legal expression
of this exclusion. Christians face occasional violence and institutional
pressure. Dalits' relationship with Hindutva is complex — the RSS argues Dalits
are Hindus whose social oppression was produced by foreign-influence, not by Hinduism itself; Dalit activists counter that Hinduism's
caste hierarchy is internal to Hindu society and Hindutva nationalism does not
address this.
What People Often Misunderstand
- Hindutva
is not the same as Hinduism: Savarkar's definition was explicitly
political and ethnic, not religious; most practicing Hindus do not
subscribe to Hindutva as a political project; the BJP's support base
includes many Hindus who vote primarily on development, governance, or
caste grounds rather than ideological commitment to Hindutva.
- The
1996 Supreme Court judgment on Hindutva is not a complete legal clearance:
The court's observation that appealing to "Hindutva" is not
automatically a corrupt practice was made in a specific legal context
about election speeches; it does not mean all Hindutva-motivated policy is
constitutionally permissible; the CAA has been challenged before the
Supreme Court and its constitutionality remains under examination.
- The
Ram Temple was built on a Supreme Court judgment, not a BJP decree:
The 2019 Ayodhya judgment awarded the disputed site to the Hindu litigant
party; it also awarded an alternative plot to the Muslim litigant for a
mosque; the BJP government implemented the court's ruling, not an
extra-legal decree; the political framing of the temple as a BJP
achievement is a simplification of the judicial and constitutional
process.
- Democratic
backsliding in V-Dem indices reflects multiple factors: India's
declining democracy scores in international indices reflect press freedom,
judicial independence, minority rights, and civil society space — not just
electoral processes; the EVM voting system itself is not cited as a
primary driver of index decline.
- The
NRC has been implemented only in Assam: A national NRC requiring all
citizens to prove Indian citizenship has been discussed but not
implemented; the Assam NRC (completed 2019) excluded approximately 1.9
million people from the citizen list, of whom many are Hindu Bengalis as
well as Muslims; the political dynamics of a national NRC are
significantly more complex than Assam's.
What Changes Over Time
The 131st Constitutional Amendment on Lok Sabha expansion —
introduced in April 2026 but failing to pass in the same month — represents the
most recent constitutional ambition of the BJP era; its defeat in the Lok Sabha
illustrates that even a majority government faces limits when its coalition
partners' state-level interests diverge from central ambition. The
Sabarimala-related nine-judge Constitution Bench examining religious freedom,
constitutional morality, and gender equality — incorporating Centre's challenge
to the "constitutional morality" doctrine — may produce judgments
that affect the constitutional relationship between Hindu religious practices,
state intervention, and minority rights.
Sources and Further Reading
- Britannica
— Hindutva: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hindutva
- Carnegie Endowment — The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/04/the-bjp-in-power-indian-democracy-and-religious-nationalism
- Foreign
Affairs — The Staying Power of India's Hindu Right: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/staying-power-indias-hindu-right
- Verfassungsblog
— Democracy and the ECI: 2024 in Review: https://verfassungsblog.de/democracy-and-the-election-commission-of-india/
