How Religion Shapes Indian Elections
Religion has always been a dimension of Indian electoral politics. The Constitution's architects knew this and explicitly prohibited appeals to religion as a basis for seeking votes under Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act. Despite this prohibition, religious identity shapes Indian elections through three distinct channels: the mobilisation of Hindu voters around Hindutva nationalism; the strategic consolidation of Muslim voters behind secular parties; and communal political rhetoric that polarises electorates along religious lines before and during campaigns.
These channels are constitutional violations when they cross specific thresholds, but are persistent features of electoral competition that the law has not effectively suppressed.
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| Representational image: How Religion Shapes Indian Elections |
BJP's electoral strategy has increasingly operated on this logic — the party did not field a single Muslim candidate in either Andhra Pradesh or West Bengal in the May 2026 state elections, and senior BJP leaders explicitly credited its Bengal victory to Hindu voter support.
As Modern Diplomacy reported on May 7, 2026 — the day the election
results were declared — "Hindu voters strongly backed Prime Minister
Narendra Modi and Muslim voters increasingly consolidated behind the opposition
Indian National Congress party," with analysts describing "a form of
reverse polarisation."
What You Need to Know
- The
BJP did not field any Muslim candidates in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections —
a deliberate strategic choice reflecting the party's assessment that
Muslim candidates would not attract Hindu votes and that the party could
win a majority without Muslim vote share; 14% of India's population had
zero representation in the BJP's winning candidate list.
- Carnegie
Endowment research (February 2024) found that Muslim voting patterns are
not monolithic — there is significant variation by state, caste, and
strategic calculation about which secular party is best placed to defeat
the BJP in a given constituency; Muslim voters in UP consolidated behind
the Congress-SP alliance in 2024, contributing to BJP's underperformance
there.
- The
BJP's 2024 campaign included speeches by PM Modi warning of Muslim
"infiltrators" taking Hindu wealth — the ECI issued an advisory
to Modi for violating the Model Code of Conduct; the Supreme Court in
Abhiram Singh (2017) held that seeking votes on grounds of religion is a
corrupt practice, but the standard of proof required for disqualification
is stringent.
- Freedom
House's 2025 India report noted that Modi "stirred up communal
tensions" during the 2024 campaign and that "elections were
considered generally free and fair, though some violations of campaign
rules were reported" including the ECI's "perceived leniency in
addressing violations of the Model Code of Conduct, such as inflammatory
speeches and misuse of religion in campaigning, including by Prime
Minister Modi."
- The
May 2026 state election results in West Bengal — BJP's first-ever state
victory, with 206/294 seats — were explicitly framed in religious terms by
BJP's prospective Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari who declared "it
was a victory for Hindutva" according to FMT reporting; BJP did not
field Muslim candidates in the state.
How It Works in Practice
1. Hindu consolidation as electoral strategy: BJP's
electoral mathematics relies on consolidating Hindu votes across caste
divisions by positioning the party as the defender of Hindu civilisational
identity against perceived Muslim threat. This strategy exploits the
demographic arithmetic: even partial Hindu consolidation across caste lines
produces electoral majorities that override Muslim vote consolidation with
opposition parties, because Hindus are 80% of the electorate.
2. Muslim strategic voting: Because BJP does not
field Muslim candidates and explicitly positions itself against Muslim
political interests, Muslim voters have strong incentives to vote strategically
for the secular party most likely to defeat the BJP candidate in their
constituency. Carnegie Endowment research shows this produces seat-level Muslim
concentration behind the strategically strongest anti-BJP candidate rather than
a monolithic Muslim voting bloc nationally.
3. Communal rhetoric as mobilisation tool:
Pre-election periods consistently see increases in communal incidents and
political rhetoric in India. ACLED research documented that hate speech
directed at Muslims peaked during 2023 state election campaigns; the BJP won
three of the five states that held elections that year. The correlation does
not prove causation, but the strategic incentive for communal mobilisation —
activating Hindu emotional solidarity — is structurally embedded in the
electoral arithmetic.
4. Opposition's dilemma: Al Jazeera's 2024 election
analysis documented the secular opposition's dilemma: explicitly defending
Muslim rights risks "consolidation of Hindu voters behind the BJP,"
so opposition parties often avoid public advocacy for Muslim interests even
while seeking Muslim votes. This produces a situation where Muslims are, as one
analyst quoted in the report put it, wanted as "voters not as
leaders" by secular parties.
5. Constitutional limits and their partial enforcement:
Section 123(3) of the RPA prohibits electoral appeals on grounds of religion;
the Abhiram Singh Constitution Bench (2017) clarified this extends to appeals
on behalf of voters' religion as well as candidates'; conviction of election
petition on this ground requires proof of a specific appeal with electoral
intent. In practice, enforcement requires filing election petitions within 45
days of results, pursuing them through High Courts with limited resources, and
meeting a demanding burden of proof — making legal consequences rare even when
communal appeals are documented.
What People Often Misunderstand
- Muslim
voters are not a bloc — they are strategic calculators: Carnegie
Endowment research confirms that Muslim voting patterns vary significantly
by state and constituency based on which party has the best chance of
defeating BJP locally; characterising "the Muslim vote" as a
uniform bloc misrepresents a highly strategic voting community.
- Hindu
consolidation is not complete — caste still fragments Hindu votes:
Even in BJP's strong performances, OBC Yadav voters largely vote for
SP/RJD, Dalit Jatav voters largely vote for BSP, and many other caste
sub-groups split differently; "Hindu consolidation" is a
tendency toward BJP, not a monolithic bloc comparable to what would
produce 79% BJP vote share.
- Communal
appeals violate the RPA even if not prosecuted: The legal prohibition
on communal electoral appeals exists; the problem is enforcement, not the
absence of law; the ECI's issuance of advisories without punitive
follow-up creates a norm of symbolic enforcement.
- The
"secular vs communal" framing misrepresents India's complexity:
Tamil Nadu's Dravidian politics mobilises Hindu identity through
anti-Brahmin cultural assertion that is simultaneously Hindu-centric and
resistant to BJP's north Indian Hindutva; Sikh majority Punjab's political
identity cannot be captured by the Hindu-Muslim binary; religion's role in
elections differs significantly across regions.
- Religious
identity and economic interest are not mutually exclusive: Voters who
support BJP for Hindu nationalist reasons also expect development, welfare
delivery, and economic performance; the welfare-nationalism combination is
more durable than purely cultural appeals because it provides material
benefits alongside identity validation.
What Changes Over Time
The May 2026 election results — BJP's Bengal victory
attributed by its own leaders to Hindutva mobilisation; Tamil Nadu disrupted by
a new party on non-Hindutva grounds; Kerala shifting away from Left — suggest a
complex and evolving picture. Modern Diplomacy's analysis on May 7, 2026 warned
that "continued consolidation of Hindu voters around the BJP and Muslim
voters around Congress could deepen social and political divisions in the years
ahead" — a concern that reflects the structural direction rather than a
sudden change.
Sources and Further Reading
- Modern
Diplomacy — India State Election Results Highlight Growing Hindu Muslim
Political Divide: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/05/07/india-state-election-results-highlight-growing-hindu-muslim-political-divide/
- Carnegie
Endowment — Mapping Muslim Voting Behavior in India: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/mapping-muslim-voting-behavior-in-india
- Al
Jazeera — Did secular parties let Muslims down too: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/5/india-election-results-did-secular-parties-let-down-muslims-too
- Freedom
House — India Freedom in the World 2025: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2025
- The
Diplomat — How Minorities Voted in 2024: https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/how-minorities-voted-in-the-indian-general-election/