How India Navigates the Indo-Pacific Strategy

India's Indo-Pacific strategy — framing the Indian Ocean and Pacific as a single strategic theatre rather than two separate regions — is simultaneously India's most explicitly articulated strategic framework and its most carefully hedged. 

India has used "Indo-Pacific" as a strategic concept since PM Modi's 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue address (Singapore), where he described India's vision of a "Free, Open, Inclusive Indo-Pacific" — carefully inserting "inclusive" to distinguish India's framing (where ASEAN and China can participate) from the US/Japan framing (where "free and open" is essentially about managing China). India participates in the Quad's security dimension while participating in BRICS and SCO alongside China; it pursues the "SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine for the Indian Ocean while building the Quad's Indo-Pacific framework.

Representational Image: How India Navigates the Indo-Pacific Strategy

India's Indo-Pacific strategy has four operational dimensions: maritime (maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, countering Chinese naval expansion, protecting critical sea lanes); economic (promoting connectivity alternatives to BRI, IMEC, and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework); security (Quad multilateral exercises, bilateral defence agreements with Quad members and Vietnam); and institutional (supporting ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific governance frameworks, building BIMSTEC as a South-Southeast Asia bridge). The Indian Ocean is India's primary strategic domain — the "String of Pearls" (Chinese port investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives, Djibouti) creates India's most immediate security concern in the broader Indo-Pacific context.

What You Need to Know

• QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue): India, US, Japan, Australia; first meeting 2007 (suspended 2008); revived 2017; elevated to leader level 2021; covers: vaccines (Quad Vaccine Partnership), technology (semiconductor supply chains, 5G/Open RAN), climate, infrastructure (Blue Dot Network alternative to BRI), maritime security; annual leader summits; foreign ministers meet multiple times yearly; Malabar naval exercises (India, US, Japan — Australia invited in 2020).
• India's Indian Ocean strategy: India maintains the largest Indian Ocean naval presence among regional states; INS Vikrant (first domestically built aircraft carrier, commissioned 2022) and INS Vikramaditya carrier battle groups extend India's maritime reach; India operates surveillance from Andaman and Nicobar Islands (strategic position at the Malacca Strait chokepoint); India provides maritime domain awareness to Indian Ocean island states; India has exclusive economic zone (EEZ) enforcement capacity through maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I) and coast guard vessels.
• SAGAR doctrine: Security and Growth for All in the Region; articulated by PM Modi at Mauritius, March 2015; frames India as the "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean; covers disaster relief, maritime security, counter-piracy, hydrographic surveys, and regional economic development; positions India as a responsible Indo-Pacific power that provides public goods to the Indian Ocean Region.
• Malabar exercises: annual India-US-Japan naval exercise (Australia added 2020); tests carrier battle group operations, submarine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, aerial refuelling, and amphibious operations; the exercises give the Quad military interoperability that provides credibility to the security partnership; India had previously kept Malabar India-US bilateral (excluding Japan and Australia) to avoid antagonising China; inviting Australia demonstrated India's willingness to signal security alignment with the Quad.
• China's Indian Ocean presence: China's PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) deployments to the Indian Ocean (counter-piracy missions since 2008 provide pretext for sustained presence); China's port investments (Hambantota Sri Lanka lease 99 years, Djibouti military base — China's only overseas military base); CPEC's Gwadar port (Pakistan-China corridor end point on the Arabian Sea) — collectively representing what India calls the "String of Pearls" encirclement.

How It Works in Practice

1. The "inclusive" qualifier as strategic hedge: India's insistence on "free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific" — adding "inclusive" to the US/Japan "free and open" — reflects India's unwillingness to participate in an explicit China-containment framework; including "inclusive" signals that China can participate if it follows rules-based order; this allows India to participate in Quad without formally endorsing the "Quad is an Asian NATO" characterisation that China most objects to; it maintains the multi-alignment logic within the Indo-Pacific concept itself.

2. India as the Quad's indispensable but most hedged member: The Quad's geographical significance depends on India — without India, Quad is a Pacific Ocean arrangement (US, Japan, Australia); with India, Quad becomes an Indian Ocean-Pacific arrangement that encompasses China's entire maritime periphery. India's Quad participation is therefore more strategically valuable than its political hedging might suggest; the US, Japan, and Australia accept India's "inclusive" qualifier precisely because India's membership without it is better than India's non-membership with the full security alignment framing.

3. AUKUS as the indicator of India's Quad limitations: AUKUS (Australia-UK-US nuclear submarine technology transfer agreement, September 2021) does not include India; India is not part of the technology-sharing arrangement that gives Australia nuclear-powered submarines using US technology; this illustrates the limits of India's integration into the security partnership — India is not a treaty ally and therefore not a technology-sharing partner at the AUKUS level; India's strategic autonomy prevents the full security integration that AUKUS represents.

4. Maritime security and counter-piracy as Indian Ocean public good: India's Resident Mission deployments for counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden; HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) response to Indian Ocean coastal country disasters (2004 tsunami, Cyclone Idai Mozambique 2019); Search and Rescue operations for stranded vessels; and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) sharing with Indian Ocean island states are India's most consistent public goods provision — these build India's "net security provider" brand through action rather than declaration.

5. India-Vietnam security partnership as Indo-Pacific southern anchor: Vietnam's South China Sea disputes with China create natural India-Vietnam security alignment; India has provided BrahMos missile systems (two batteries confirmed), naval patrol vessels (Coast Guard ships), and military training to Vietnam; Vietnam is the only country outside India to possess BrahMos; this provides India with an anchoring partner in Southeast Asia's maritime domain that directly challenges China's South China Sea assertiveness.

What People Often Misunderstand

• The Quad is not a military alliance: The Quad has no mutual defence clause, no joint command, no pre-committed military response obligation; it is a consultation mechanism with military exercises and cooperation; calling it "Asian NATO" overstates its current structure even if understating its potential development trajectory.
• India's "inclusive Indo-Pacific" is not purely a hedge — it also reflects India's ASEAN policy: India genuinely believes ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific governance is important; ASEAN's "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" (AOIP) explicitly calls for an "inclusive" framework; India's framing aligns with ASEAN's preferred architecture, not just as a China-management hedge.
• China's Indian Ocean expansion is real but limited in military character: China's Indian Ocean port investments are primarily commercial; the Djibouti base is China's only military facility; China's anti-piracy deployments maintain a navy presence; but China doesn't yet have the integrated Indian Ocean naval infrastructure that US maintains; India's advantage in Indian Ocean military presence is substantial and not immediately at risk.
• India and China participate in the same maritime governance bodies: Despite Indo-Pacific security competition, India and China participate in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), BIMSTEC (China is not a member but observers), and SCO (India and China both members); maritime governance cooperation is not foreclosed by bilateral competition.
• Australia's QUAD engagement has deepened to full security partnership level: Australia's 2022 security environment review and its AUKUS nuclear submarine programme represent Australia's most significant strategic shift in decades; the resulting Australia-India bilateral relationship is deeper than ever, with defence agreements, ECTA, and 2+2 dialogue; India-Australia is perhaps the Quad bilateral relationship that has improved most dramatically.

What Changes Over Time

India's INS Arighaat commission (2024) and the planned third Arihant-class SSBN will extend India's undersea nuclear deterrent into the Indo-Pacific, making India a more credible Indo-Pacific strategic actor. India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands development (airstrips, naval bases, radar) will extend India's maritime surveillance and power projection into the Malacca Strait area over 2025–2030.

Sources and Further Reading

• Stimson Center — BRICS Quad multi-alignment: https://www.stimson.org/2022/brics-quad-and-indias-multi-alignment-strategy/
• Chatham House — BRICS Quad balancing: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/back-back-brics-and-quad-meetings-highlight-indias-increasingly-difficult-balancing-act
• CSIS — India's future strategic choices: https://www.csis.org/analysis/indias-future-strategic-choices-complications-mass
• ORF — Operation Sindoor: https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-the-aftermath-of-operation-sindoor-escalation-deterrence-and-india-pakistan-strategic-stability

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