How India Manages the Russia Relationship

India's relationship with Russia — formally designated a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" — is India's most enduring great power relationship: anchored in decades of defence supply, diplomatic support on Jammu and Kashmir (Soviet/Russian UNSC veto protection), and economic cooperation that includes the Kudankulam nuclear power plant (built with Russian assistance). 

The relationship has been severely tested since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine: India has abstained on all UN votes condemning Russia; continued purchasing Russian discounted crude oil (making India Russia's largest crude buyer at approximately 1.8 million bpd); maintained defence procurement (S-400 delivery continued 2021–22; BrahMos joint venture ongoing); and resisted Western pressure to sanction Russia — all while stating that "this is not an era of war" and calling for dialogue. The Modi-Putin Kazan meeting (October 2024, on the sidelines of BRICS) and Modi's Moscow visit (July 2024) demonstrated the relationship's continuity.

Representational Visualization: How India Manages the Russia Relationship

The relationship's strategic logic from India's side is: Russia is not replaceable as a defence supplier in the short term (60%+ of India's military equipment is Russian-origin; spare parts, upgrades, and ammunition depend on continued Russian cooperation); Russia's support on Kashmir (though less automatic than during the Soviet era) remains diplomatically valuable; and India sees no interest in being drawn into a US-Russia conflict that has no direct bearing on India's primary security concerns (China, Pakistan). 

The cost of this position — US secondary tariffs, restricted technology-sharing, exclusion from some Five Eyes intelligence cooperation — is calibrated as acceptable compared to the cost of foregoing strategic autonomy on Russia.

What You Need to Know

• India-Russia defence dependency: approximately 60% of India's military equipment is Russian or Soviet-origin; S-400 air defence system delivered 2021–22 (CAATSA waiver concerns remain unresolved); AK-203 rifle joint venture (Amethi factory, 600,000 rifles planned); BrahMos joint venture (cruise missile jointly produced and exported); Russia is the only country supplying India with nuclear submarines (leased), aircraft carrier maintenance experience (INS Vikramaditya), and SS-type ICBM technology.
• Russia-India oil trade: post-Ukraine war, India increased Russian crude purchases from near-zero to approximately 1.8 million bpd — making India Russia's largest crude buyer; India receives discounted crude (approximately 15–20% below international market price in 2022–23; discount narrowed in 2024); paid primarily in rupees (with dollar conversion complexities); total value approximately $60 billion+ for FY2024.
• US secondary tariffs: Trump administration (2025) imposed 25% additional tariff on Indian exports explicitly linked to India's Russian oil purchases; India described this as "unfair, unjustified and unreasonable"; this represents the first direct US economic pressure on India for its Russia relationship; India did not significantly reduce Russian purchases in response.
• India-Russia 2+2 dialogue: Foreign and Defence Ministers' dialogue (2+2 format) held regularly; the dialogue covers defence supply, energy, counter-terrorism, multilateral coordination; Russian FM Lavrov visits New Delhi; EAM Jaishankar visits Moscow; the 2+2 format mirrors the India-US 2+2, signalling Russia's continued "strategic" status.
• Kudankulam nuclear plant: six 1,000MW reactor units planned; Units 1 and 2 operational since 2013 and 2017; Units 3 and 4 under construction; Units 5 and 6 planned; the plant represents Russia's most significant civilian economic investment in India; nuclear cooperation provides Russia strategic leverage in India's energy planning.

How It Works in Practice

1. The defence dependency reduction challenge: India's long-term strategy is to reduce Russian defence dependency through: Make in India defence production (AK-203 rifles, BrahMos domestically, aircraft components); increased procurement from US (F/A-18 carriers, P-8I maritime patrol), France (Rafale fighters, Scorpène submarines), Israel (drones, missiles), and Japan/Australia (future); and developing domestic platforms (LCA Tejas, AMCA advanced fighter, NMRH naval helicopter). The process is long — 10–15 year timelines for major platform transitions — meaning Russia dependency will persist through the 2020s.

2. Ukraine war navigation: India's Ukraine war position has been: abstain on UN votes; call for diplomacy and dialogue; refuse to characterise Russia's invasion as "aggression" in official statements; provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine (medicines, food); but not provide military assistance to either side; maintain economic relationship with Russia; the position satisfies no one — Western partners want stronger condemnation, Russia wants active support — but it has been sustainable as a neutral humanitarian-economic position.

3. Modi's Moscow visit (July 2024) and its optics: Modi visited Moscow for the India-Russia annual summit (July 8–9, 2024) on the same day Russian missiles struck a children's hospital in Kyiv; Modi's embrace of Putin was photographed globally; the optics were diplomatically costly (Ukrainian President Zelensky expressed "huge disappointment"; multiple European leaders protested); India defended the visit as consistent with its "engage all parties" principle; the visit had substantive defence supply discussions but the timing was poorly managed diplomatically.

4. The rupee-ruble payment problem: India's Russian oil purchases have created a currency problem: Russia accumulates large rupee balances from Indian oil payments that it cannot easily deploy (limited Indian goods Russia wants to buy); the rupee-denominated trade has created an asymmetric currency relationship where Russia holds more rupees than it can use; negotiations on alternative payment mechanisms (third-country currency, investment in India) are ongoing but unresolved.

5. Russia's Pakistan pivot: Post-Operation Sindoor, Russia increased its engagement with Pakistan — military equipment discussions, counterterrorism cooperation that includes Pakistan despite India's terrorism concerns, and Russia-Pakistan-China trilateral discussions that India views as its strategic space being encroached. If Russia's Pakistan engagement deepens substantively, it would challenge the "Special and Privileged" characterisation of the India-Russia relationship.

What People Often Misunderstand

• Russia's strategic support for India is transactional, not unconditional: Russia's UNSC support for India on Kashmir, its defence supply, and its diplomatic cover have always been based on Russia's interests — not ideological commitment to India's positions; when Russian interests diverge from India's, Russia acts in its interests (as its Pakistan engagement illustrates).
• India's Russian oil purchases benefit India, not just Russia: Discounted Russian oil is an economic benefit to India — reduced energy costs for industry, lower fuel prices; the benefit has real economic value for Indian consumers and manufacturing competitiveness; framing it as purely political misses the economic logic.
• US secondary tariffs on India for Russian purchases are unprecedented: The US has never previously imposed sanctions or tariffs on India specifically linked to its Russia relationship; this represents a qualitative escalation of US pressure on India's strategic autonomy that creates a genuine policy dilemma for India.
• India is reducing Russian defence dependency but slowly: Every major Indian defence procurement since 2014 has included a "diversification" objective; Rafale (France), AH-64E Apache (US), P-8I (US), C-17 Globemaster (US), and other Western platforms have reduced the Russian share; but the existing fleet's maintenance and spare parts dependency on Russia will persist for decades regardless of new procurement choices.
• Russia's nuclear technology cooperation with India is strategically significant and often overlooked: Kudankulam's planned six reactor expansion represents Russia's most important strategic energy investment globally (India's energy security significance); the nuclear technology relationship is harder to replace than even the conventional defence relationship.

What Changes Over Time

India's defence diversification timeline — the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), NMRH (Naval Multi-Role Helicopter), and domestic manufacture of BrahMos derivatives — will gradually reduce the Russian dependency's intensity over 2025–2035. 

The Russia-Pakistan engagement's depth will determine whether India eventually reclassifies the India-Russia relationship from "Special and Privileged" to simply a strategic partnership.

Sources and Further Reading

• Foreign Policy — India strategic autonomy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/26/india-end-strategic-autonomy/
• Tribune India — Sindoor strategic autonomy: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/bricsleadership/operation-sindoor-beyond-how-india-asserted-strategic-autonomy-amid-tariffs-security-challenges
• IRGA — India's strategic autonomy: https://irga.in/world_desc.php?id=1217
• Fair Observer — India strategic autonomy multipolar: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-current-foreign-policy-reinforcing-strategic-autonomy-in-a-rising-multipolar-world-order/
• Chatham House — BRICS Quad: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/back-back-brics-and-quad-meetings-highlight-indias-increasingly-difficult-balancing-act

(This series is part of a long-term editorial project to explain the structures, institutions, policies, and strategic frameworks that shape governance and statecraft in India for a global audience. Designed as a 25-article briefing cluster on Indian Foreign Policy Strategy & Doctrine, this vertical examines how India understands, formulates, and executes its engagement with the world — from the institutional architecture of foreign policy and the evolution from non-alignment to multi-alignment, to strategic autonomy, neighbourhood diplomacy, great-power relations, security doctrines, economic statecraft, multilateral engagement, and India's emerging role in a rapidly changing international order. Written in an accessible format for diplomats, investors, researchers, academics, journalists, policymakers, students, civil society organisations, and international observers, the series seeks to explain not only what India does abroad, but why it does so. Particular attention is given to the historical evolution of India's strategic thinking, the practical realities of decision-making, the tensions between ideals and interests, and the opportunities and constraints facing a rising power in the twenty-first century. This is Vertical 9 of a larger 20-vertical knowledge architecture being developed by IndianRepublic.in under the editorial direction of Saket Suman. All articles are protected under applicable copyright laws. All Rights Reserved.)