How India Engages With the Gulf and Middle East

India's Middle East and Gulf engagement has undergone profound transformation under Modi — from a relationship primarily defined by energy dependence and diaspora management to a comprehensive strategic partnership characterised by security cooperation, economic investment, and geopolitical alignment. The "Think West" addition to India's directional foreign policy doctrines reflects this transformation: India is not merely looking east and engaging its neighbourhood, but actively cultivating the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as strategic partners. 

The Gulf's importance to India is structural: approximately 18 million Indian diaspora in the Gulf (the largest concentration of the 32 million strong Indian diaspora globally), contributing $120+ billion in annual remittances (the world's largest remittance flow); approximately 40–50% of India's oil imports from Gulf states; and growing Indian defence, infrastructure, and technology exports to the region.

Representational Visualization: How India Engages With the Gulf and Middle East

The UAE relationship under Modi has been the most transformed: from routine labour-migration management to a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" with a signed India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA, February 2022 — India's fastest-concluded trade agreement at 88 days); the India-UAE-Israel axis that emerged in the context of the Abraham Accords (UAE-Israel normalisation, 2020, from which India benefited diplomatically); and PM Modi's first visit to Israel (2017) — breaking with India's traditional pro-Palestinian solidarity that had led Indian PMs to visit Arab capitals before Tel Aviv. 

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince MBS has visited New Delhi and received Modi in Riyadh; Saudi investment in Indian infrastructure and Saudi oil sales to India make Riyadh India's most important strategic Arab relationship.

What You Need to Know

• Indian diaspora in the Gulf: approximately 9 million in UAE, approximately 3.5 million in Saudi Arabia, plus significant communities in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman; majority in skilled and semi-skilled employment; remittances approximately $80–100 billion/year from the Gulf; labour welfare remains a policy concern (kafala sponsorship system, wage protection).
• India-UAE CEPA (2022): Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed February 18, 2022; came into force May 1, 2022; covers goods (duty elimination on 97% of Indian goods entering UAE), services, investment; bilateral trade target $100 billion by 2030; UAE is India's third-largest trade partner; fastest-concluded FTA in India's history.
• India-Israel relationship: Full diplomatic relations restored 1992; Modi first Indian PM to visit Israel (July 2017, skipping Palestine during the visit); India-Israel bilateral trade approximately $9 billion; defence cooperation: Israel is India's second-largest defence supplier (after Russia) for drones (Heron, Searcher), missiles (Barak), surveillance systems, ammunition; Israel-Hamas war (October 2023) tested India's position — India called for hostages' release and humanitarian access while avoiding condemnation of Israel (abstaining on key UNGA resolutions).
• IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor): announced at G20 New Delhi 2023; proposed rail and shipping corridor connecting India to Gulf (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and onward to Greece (Piraeus) and Europe; participants: India, US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Israel, EU; conceptually competes with China's BRI; physical implementation requires: Indian port development (Mundra/JNPT), Gulf rail links, Israel-Jordan corridor, Eastern Mediterranean shipping; timeline estimated 2030+.
• Post-Sindoor Saudi complication: Saudi Arabia signed a "Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement" with Pakistan in the second half of 2025 — the first formal Saudi security commitment to Pakistan in decades; India viewed this as Pakistan successfully using the Sindoor aftermath to deepen Saudi-Pakistan ties; India has been working to ensure the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact does not affect Saudi Arabia's relationship with India.

How It Works in Practice

1. Energy security diversification through Gulf partnerships: India's crude oil supply is predominantly Gulf-origin (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait) supplemented by Russian discounted crude (post-2022); the Gulf's energy supply is both India's greatest dependency and its greatest leverage with Gulf states — India's large consumption makes it an indispensable customer. India's energy diplomacy (long-term supply agreements, rupee payment arrangements for some purchases, refinery joint ventures) aims to secure supply while managing price.

2. India-Israel defence as the critical security partnership: Israel is India's most important defence technology supplier after Russia and the US; Israeli drone technology (Heron, Searcher, Harop loitering munitions), precision munitions, and intelligence cooperation have been central to India's asymmetric capabilities development; the Abraham Accords' normalisation of UAE-Israel and Bahrain-Israel relations opened a potential India-UAE-Israel security dialogue that was previously complicated by India's Gulf relationships requiring pro-Arab positioning.

3. Iran as the exception: Iran presents India's most complex Gulf relationship: India needs Iran's Chabahar port (for Afghanistan access and Neighbourhood First connectivity to Central Asia), Iran's natural gas, and Iran's political cooperation for regional stability; Iran is also under US sanctions (CAATSA risk for India-Iran cooperation) and is a BRICS+ member (since 2024); India has navigated Iran's inclusion in BRICS while managing US concerns; Chabahar port cooperation continued despite US sanctions through a specific US sanctions exemption that has been periodically renewed.

4. The diaspora welfare dimension: India's Gulf diaspora is predominantly low-to-mid-skilled workers in the construction, hospitality, and domestic services sectors; the kafala (sponsorship) system ties workers to employers, creating documented abuse vulnerability; India negotiates bilaterally with GCC states for labour welfare improvements; the Gulf's push toward citizens-first employment policies (Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia, Emiratisation in UAE) reduces demand for some Indian worker categories; India is actively engaging Gulf states to protect existing workers while diversifying to higher-skilled categories.

5. The IMEC ambition and its obstacles: The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was the G20 2023's most geopolitically significant announced outcome — a potential Chinese BRI competitor running through India's Gulf partners and Israel to Europe. Its physical obstacles are substantial: the Israel-Hamas war (October 2023) suspended the Israel-Jordan rail element; the Gaza ceasefire trajectory remains uncertain; UAE-Saudi infrastructure investment is proceeding; India's port development plans are moving; but IMEC's 2030+ timeline faces the additional complications of Middle Eastern conflict and European port competitiveness.

What People Often Misunderstand

• India is not a Gulf ally — it is a strategic partner with each state separately: India maintains strategic partnerships with UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar while also maintaining a relationship with Iran; these three (UAE/Saudi/Qatar vs Iran) have a complicated regional rivalry that India tries not to choose sides in; India's position is bilateral engagement without taking sides in intra-Gulf rivalries.
• India's Israel relationship is relatively new and diplomatically costly: India's deepening Israel relationship has alienated significant segments of India's Muslim population domestically and has created complications in India's Palestinian Authority relationship; the 2023 Gaza conflict produced protests in India; Modi's Israel position (calling for hostage release without condemning Israeli military operations) reflects a deliberate calibration that accepts some domestic cost for the bilateral strategic benefit.
• Saudi Arabia-Pakistan's defence agreement does not automatically threaten India: The Saudi-Pakistan defence agreement is a Pakistani diplomatic success; but India-Saudi relations have their own structural depth (energy, diaspora, investment) that Pakistan cannot easily disrupt; India's challenge is ensuring that the Sindoor episode doesn't permanently shift Saudi Arabia's India-Pakistan neutrality into pro-Pakistan positioning.
• The Chabahar port-Chabahar exception is strategically significant: US sanctions on Iran should in principle prevent India from developing the Chabahar port; the US-granted exception (specific to Chabahar, unlike other Iran sanctions) reflects US recognition that Indian access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Chabahar serves US interests; this exception is a concrete example of US-India strategic alignment producing pragmatic Iran policy flexibility.
• Remittances are both India's greatest Gulf economic asset and its greatest vulnerability: The $80–100 billion annual Gulf remittance flow is critical to India's current account balance; if Gulf oil revenues decline (energy transition) and Gulf employment of Indians decreases (citizens-first policies), India's balance of payments would face significant pressure; diversifying India's diaspora to higher-value Gulf employment categories is a priority.

What Changes Over Time

The IMEC corridor's progress — conditional on Middle Eastern political stability — will be the most strategically significant infrastructure development in the India-Gulf relationship over 2025–2030. Saudi Vision 2030's economic diversification (moving beyond oil) is creating new opportunities for Indian technology, healthcare, education, and services exports to Saudi Arabia.

Sources and Further Reading

• News India Times — India's foreign policy 2025: https://newsindiatimes.com/turning-strategic-autonomy-into-genuine-influence-a-look-back-at-indias-agile-foreign-policy-in-2025/
• Khan Global Studies — India's foreign policy: https://www.khanglobalstudies.com/blog/indias-foreign-policy-2025/
• Tribune India — Sindoor strategic autonomy: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/bricsleadership/operation-sindoor-beyond-how-india-asserted-strategic-autonomy-amid-tariffs-security-challenges
• CSIS — India's strategic choices: https://www.csis.org/analysis/indias-future-strategic-choices-complications-mass
• MEA — Annual Report 2024: https://www.mea.gov.in/annual-report.htm

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