How India Engages With Central Asia

India's Central Asia engagement — through the "Connect Central Asia" policy (launched 2012), the India-Central Asia Summit framework (first virtual summit January 2022, physical summit targeted for 2023), and the SCO framework (India joined 2017) — is among India's most strategically significant but least domestically recognised foreign policy domains. 

Central Asia matters to India for several reasons: five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) with approximately 75 million people; significant energy resources (Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas); transit routes for India-Russia and India-Central Asia trade (via Chabahar-Afghanistan corridor, challenged by the Taliban's Afghanistan); and the Afghan stability connection — Central Asian instability directly affects India's security environment.

Representational Visualization: How India Engages With Central Asia

India's Central Asia access challenge is geographic: India has no direct land access to Central Asia because Pakistan-India hostility prevents overland transit through Pakistan; India's options are: sea route via Arabian Sea → Gwadar (Pakistan controls, CPEC complication) or Chabahar (Iran) → Afghanistan → Central Asia; air route (India-Central Asia direct flights, limited); or Northern Distribution Network via Russia. 

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan (August 2021) severely disrupted India's primary land access corridor — India had invested $3 billion in Afghanistan (Salma Dam, Afghan Parliament building, Delaram-Zaranj highway) specifically to create the Afghanistan transit corridor to Central Asia; Taliban's hostile relationship with India has effectively closed this corridor.

What You Need to Know

• India-Central Asia first summit (January 2022): virtual summit between India and five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan); committed to: diplomatic relations to comprehensive partnerships; trade connectivity roadmap; security cooperation; agreed on "India-Central Asia Dialogue" as regular mechanism.
• SCO membership: India and Pakistan both joined SCO at Astana summit June 2017; SCO members include China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus (2024), Iran (2023); India participates in SCO counter-terrorism structures (RATS), trade discussions, and annual summits; SCO is a China-Russia co-led institution where India is a significant but not dominant member; India's SCO participation alongside Pakistan is the same structural awkwardness as BRICS alongside China.
• Chabahar port: India has invested approximately $500 million in Chabahar port development (Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchestan); connected by India-financed road to Zaranj (Afghan-Iran border) → Zaranj-Delaram highway (India-built) → Afghanistan → Central Asia; the corridor is the only India-access route to Central Asia and Afghanistan that bypasses Pakistan; US sanctions exemption for Chabahar has been maintained (specific exemption from Iran sanctions for India's Chabahar port activity, renewed periodically).
• INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor): India-initiated multi-modal transport corridor connecting India to Russia via Iran and the Caspian Sea; India → Iran (Bandar Abbas port or Chabahar) → Iran railway → Azerbaijan or Caspian ferry → Russia; total length 7,200km; aimed at reducing India-Russia transit time from 40 days (via Suez Canal) to 25 days; operational for limited volumes since 2014; became more important after Russia-Ukraine war (alternative to Suez route under Western shipping restrictions).
• Afghanistan's collapse impact: India's $3 billion investment in Afghan infrastructure is at risk; Taliban government is hostile to India; India has maintained limited Taliban engagement (Indian diplomats visit Kabul periodically for consular and humanitarian purposes) without formal recognition; India is concerned about Pakistan-Taliban-China trilateral coordination that further marginalises Indian interests; India's Afghan connectivity corridor (Zaranj-Delaram) is unused.

How It Works in Practice

1. The Pakistan blockage problem: India's inability to use Pakistan's territory for transit to Central Asia is the defining constraint of India's Central Asia policy; China and Russia both have direct land access to Central Asia; India's access requires the Iran-Afghanistan corridor (disrupted by Taliban), the Russia route (INSTC, commercially limited), or air connections (expensive, low-volume); resolving India's Central Asia access requires either Pakistan normalisation (politically impossible currently) or building the Iran-Afghanistan corridor to sufficient capacity.

2. Energy trade — Central Asian LNG and oil: India has sought to import Central Asian energy (Kazakh and Turkmen natural gas and oil); the TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) has been planned since the 1990s but never built (Afghanistan security + Pakistan-India relations); India has purchased Kazakh crude oil routed through third countries; Central Asian energy's proximity makes it theoretically attractive but politically constrained by access routes.

3. India's SCO leverage: Within the SCO, India can influence the organization's counter-terrorism definitions (resisting broadening the definition to include political opposition groups), its trade frameworks (India-Central Asia preferential trade), and its security coordination (RATS information sharing on extremist groups threatening India's interests in Central Asia); India is not a dominant SCO power but uses its weight to shape outcomes on issues important to it.

4. Defence cooperation with Central Asian states: India has bilateral defence agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (training, equipment, personnel exchanges); Tajikistan hosts the Indian Air Force's Farkhor air base (the only Indian military facility outside India, used for limited logistical purposes); the base's utility post-Taliban Afghanistan closure of the transit corridor is reduced but it maintains India's military presence footprint in Central Asia.

5. Taliban engagement as pragmatic necessity: Despite ideological incompatibility, India has maintained limited contact with the Taliban government — Indian diplomats in Kabul for consular and intelligence purposes; India provides humanitarian assistance (wheat shipments through Pakistan, exceptional given India-Pakistan tensions); India has not formally recognised the Taliban government; the engagement reflects India's pragmatic assessment that Afghanistan cannot be entirely ignored even under hostile leadership.

What People Often Misunderstand

• India's Central Asia policy has been severely damaged by the Taliban takeover: The Indian diplomatic and analytical community's investment in Afghanistan as India's Central Asia access route predated August 2021; the Taliban's takeover eliminated the corridor India built over 20 years; India's Central Asia policy lost its primary land access route overnight.
• INSTC is real but commercially modest: The International North-South Transport Corridor has operational legs (India-Iran sea; Iran-Azerbaijan rail; Azerbaijan-Russia rail) but full through-transit is commercially limited; Russia-Ukraine war increased INSTC's strategic urgency but hasn't yet produced commercially significant volumes; it remains a strategic demonstration of connectivity rather than a transformation of India-Russia-Central Asia trade.
• SCO is a China-Russia institution — India participates but doesn't shape it: SCO was founded by China and Russia; its institutional culture reflects China-Russia interests; India can block or modify some outcomes (like terrorism definition overbroadening) but cannot fundamentally redirect SCO's institutional agenda; India's SCO participation is about being inside rather than outside this China-Russia coordinated institution.
• The TAPI pipeline has been "imminent" for 30 years: TAPI was first proposed in the 1990s; it has never advanced beyond planning due to the same Afghanistan security problem; every few years both India and Pakistan reaffirm interest; the strategic logic (Central Asian gas for energy-hungry South Asia) remains valid but the Afghanistan security prerequisite remains missing.
• India's Central Asia investment has produced goodwill but limited connectivity: India's educational scholarships for Central Asian students, ITEC training programmes, and cultural engagement have built genuine relationships; but without physical connectivity, the goodwill hasn't translated into the trade and energy relationships India seeks.

What Changes Over Time

The Chabahar-Afghanistan-Central Asia corridor's viability depends on Taliban governance evolution in Afghanistan — if the Taliban's international isolation reduces and minimal stability returns, India's access corridor through Chabahar could become functional; this is a 5–10 year prospect at best.

Sources and Further Reading

• Fair Observer — India strategic autonomy: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-current-foreign-policy-reinforcing-strategic-autonomy-in-a-rising-multipolar-world-order/
• Insightsonindia — India's evolving foreign policy: https://www.insightsonindia.com/2025/06/10/indias-evolving-foreign-policy/
• CSIS — India's future choices: https://www.csis.org/analysis/indias-future-strategic-choices-complications-mass

(This series is part of a long-term editorial project to explain the structures, institutions, policies, and strategic frameworks that shape governance and statecraft in India for a global audience. Designed as a 25-article briefing cluster on Indian Foreign Policy Strategy & Doctrine, this vertical examines how India understands, formulates, and executes its engagement with the world — from the institutional architecture of foreign policy and the evolution from non-alignment to multi-alignment, to strategic autonomy, neighbourhood diplomacy, great-power relations, security doctrines, economic statecraft, multilateral engagement, and India's emerging role in a rapidly changing international order. Written in an accessible format for diplomats, investors, researchers, academics, journalists, policymakers, students, civil society organisations, and international observers, the series seeks to explain not only what India does abroad, but why it does so. Particular attention is given to the historical evolution of India's strategic thinking, the practical realities of decision-making, the tensions between ideals and interests, and the opportunities and constraints facing a rising power in the twenty-first century. This is Vertical 9 of a larger 20-vertical knowledge architecture being developed by IndianRepublic.in under the editorial direction of Saket Suman. All articles are protected under applicable copyright laws. All Rights Reserved.)