How India Engages With BRICS and the Global South

India's participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, plus since 2024: Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Argentina reversed membership) alongside China and Russia is the dimension of Indian foreign policy that Western partners find most difficult to categorise. BRICS is simultaneously: a forum for Global South coordination on economic governance reform (IMF/World Bank reform, New Development Bank); a China-led geopolitical project to build an alternative to Western-dominated multilateral institutions; and a platform where India gains influence by being present rather than absent. 

India's engagement with BRICS reflects the multi-alignment logic: India uses BRICS for its Global South and economic reform agenda while using the Quad for its Indo-Pacific security agenda.

Representational Visualization: How India Engages With BRICS and the Global South

India's G20 Presidency (2023) was the most successful expression of India's Global South strategy: the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration was adopted by consensus (including by a US-Russia-China triad that rarely agrees); the African Union was admitted as a G20 permanent member (India's proposal, immediately accepted); India framed itself as the "Voice of the Global South" — hosting the Voice of Global South Summit virtually in January 2023 and January 2024 to build developing country consensus ahead of G20 discussions. 

The framing positions India as the legitimate bridge between the developed (G7) and developing world, leveraging its civilisational claims (India's historic role in NAM, Bandung, South-South cooperation) and its current development trajectory.

What You Need to Know

• BRICS membership: India is a founding BRICS member (2009 first summit); BRICS GDP share approximately 36% of global GDP (PPP); New Development Bank (NDB) founded 2015 ($100 billion subscribed capital); Contingent Reserve Arrangement ($100 billion emergency balance of payments support); BRICS+ expansion (2024): Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Argentina (reversed Jan 2024 under Milei); current BRICS membership approximately 9 active members.
• India's BRICS agenda: India's stated BRICS priorities include: New Development Bank growth (India is second-largest economy contributor); UNSC reform (all BRICS members support reform but differ on specifics — India wants P5 seat, China is ambiguous); dollar dependency reduction (India cautious — doesn't want premature de-dollarisation that would harm Indian rupee); climate finance for developing nations.
• Voice of Global South Summit: India hosted the "Voice of Global South" virtual summit January 2023 (125 countries) and January 2024 to build developing country consensus ahead of India's G20 Presidency; the initiative positions India as convener of the Global South rather than just a BRICS participant; the summit covers: food security, energy access, climate finance, development finance reform, digital public goods.
• G20 2023 achievements: India's G20 Presidency (December 2022–November 2023); New Delhi Leaders' Declaration adopted by all 20 members (including Russia) — the first G20 consensus declaration since 2021; African Union admission as permanent G20 member; Global DPI Framework agreed; India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced alongside G20; PM Modi hailed it as a "historic victory for developing nations."
• BRICS development bank: NDB (New Development Bank) based in Shanghai; has approved $30+ billion in projects; focuses on infrastructure and sustainable development in member countries; India is the largest project recipient after China; NDB's expansion to include non-BRICS members (Bangladesh, UAE, Rwanda, Egypt are new members) broadens its development mandate.

How It Works in Practice

1. The BRICS-Quad simultaneous membership logic: India's attendance at both the Rio de Janeiro BRICS summit (July 2025) and the Quad foreign ministers' meeting (Washington, July 2025) — within days of each other — illustrated the multi-alignment logic operationally. For Chatham House analysts, this demonstrated India's "agility" while also illustrating the "increasingly difficult balancing act." India's position is that BRICS and Quad serve different purposes (economic reform/Global South vs Indo-Pacific security) and there is no contradiction in participating in both.

2. India's NDB as economic multilateralism alternative: The NDB — which India actively shaped in its founding negotiations — provides an alternative to IMF/World Bank-linked development finance that comes without Western conditionalities. India's NDB projects (infrastructure, clean energy, healthcare) receive financing on terms that the World Bank would match but at a political cost India avoids by using NDB. The NDB is not a World Bank replacement but a genuine supplement that expands India's development finance options.

3. BRICS de-dollarisation debate — India's cautious position: BRICS members (especially Russia and China) have pushed for BRICS currency or dollar-alternative payment systems; India has been notably cautious — India's rupee internationalisation is a different-paced project from dollar elimination; India's large rupee reserves from Russian oil trade are already creating currency management challenges; India views precipitous de-dollarisation as more likely to destabilise India's financial system than to strengthen it.

4. India as Global South bridge at G20: India's G20 diplomacy frames India as the bridge between the G7 (developed economies) and the developing world — India understands both perspectives and can broker consensus. This bridging role produced the 2023 consensus Declaration when Russia-West tensions had paralysed G20 since 2022; the African Union's admission produced a tangible developing world outcome. India's framing as "Vishwamitra" (Friend of the World) and "Vishwaguru" (Teacher of the World) reflects this civilisational ambition.

5. BRICS expansion and India's dilution concern: BRICS+ expansion (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran) significantly diluted the original Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa "emerging economy" character; Iran's inclusion (which India was cautious about) created complications for India's relationships with the US, Israel, and Gulf states; Saudi Arabia and UAE's inclusion strengthened the Gulf connection; India's concern is that an expanded BRICS becomes more a China-led geopolitical project than a genuine multi-polar institution.

What People Often Misunderstand

• India is not a reluctant BRICS member — it is an active co-shaper of the institution: India designed key BRICS rules (NDB governance, CRA conditions) to prevent China from dominating; India's continued BRICS membership reflects a genuine assessment that being inside BRICS serves India's interests better than exclusion.
• The Global South framing is both genuine and strategic: India genuinely represents the developing world's interests on climate finance, development funding, and technology access; it also strategically uses the Global South framing to position itself as indispensable to both G7 and Global South — a bridge position that maximises India's diplomatic leverage.
• BRICS NDB is not an IMF alternative — it's a complement: The NDB does not provide balance-of-payments support (that's the CRA, which is underdeveloped); it provides project finance; IMF's macroeconomic stabilisation role is not being replaced; framing NDB as "dethroning the IMF" overstates its scope.
• India's G20 2023 presidency success had Russian cooperation: The consensus Delhi Declaration required Russia to agree to language on Ukraine; Russia's agreement (softer than G7 wanted) was partly facilitated by India's relationship with Moscow; this illustrates how India's Russia relationship is not purely a liability — it is sometimes an asset for international diplomacy.
• BRICS expansion creates complexity for India's China management: With Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE in BRICS, and with Russia's Pakistan pivot ongoing, India's BRICS neighbourhood is becoming more complex; managing India's interests within a BRICS that includes both Iran (India's potential energy partner) and Saudi Arabia (India's Gulf oil supplier and security partner) requires careful position calibration.

What Changes Over Time

The BRICS+ grouping's consolidation — as the new members engage with the NDB, BRICS working groups, and summits — will determine whether BRICS becomes a genuinely effective alternative multilateral institution or remains a diplomatic statement; its evolution will shape whether India's investment in BRICS membership produces commensurate returns.

Sources and Further Reading

• Chatham House — BRICS Quad: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/back-back-brics-and-quad-meetings-highlight-indias-increasingly-difficult-balancing-act
• CSIS — India's strategic choices: https://www.csis.org/analysis/indias-future-strategic-choices-complications-mass
• Stimson Center — BRICS Quad multi-alignment: https://www.stimson.org/2022/brics-quad-and-indias-multi-alignment-strategy/
• Fair Observer — India strategic autonomy: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-current-foreign-policy-reinforcing-strategic-autonomy-in-a-rising-multipolar-world-order/

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